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Abstract—Ad hoc networks operate over open environments
and are hence vulnerable to a large body of threats. To tackle
this issue, we propose a distributed, signature-based anomaly
detector that evaluates the trustworthiness of others so as to
secure such a distributed detection. Contrary to existing detectors
that passively observe packets, our detector analyses logs so as
to identify patterns of misuse and proactively collaborate with
others to gather additional evidences. As a result, no change
is requested in the implementation of the node. The main
challenge stems from difficulty involved in stating the occurrence
of an attack based on second-hands evidences that may come
from colluding attacker(s). To tackle this issue, we propose an
entropy-based trust system that evaluates the trustworthiness of
the nodes that provide the evidences. We further introduce a
novel indicator which measures the level of confidence in the
detection. Preliminary evaluations of the trust system along with
the confidence measure have been conducted.
Index Terms—Intrusion detection; Trust; MANETs; routing
protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Detecting attacks in ad hoc networks is challenging because
these networks are cooperative and hence lack of centralized
security enforcement points from which preventive strategies
are launched. Recent works showed that attacks may be identi-
fied as a deviation of the correct behavior (anomaly detection);
this correct behavior is either hand-specified relying on a
protocol description, e.g., [1] or automatically built/analyzed
using machine learning or data mining techniques, e.g., [2].
The difficulty inherent to the automatic modeling of the behav-
ior of dynamic routing protocols leads to many false positives
that are reduced by coupling automatic and specification-
based anomaly detection. An alternative, which reduces the
number of false positives, consists in describing the way the
intruder penetrates the system (by establishing an intrusion
signature) and detecting any behavior that is close to that
signature. Comparatively, little attention - to the best of our
knowledge, only couples of works [3], [4] - focuses on
signature-based detection in ad hoc networks. We propose
a signature-based intrusion detection system dedicated to the
ad hoc routing protocols. We exemplify our system on the
Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol [5] focusing
on a link spoofing attack. The general idea lies in monitoring
locally the routing activity so as to detect any preliminary sign
of suspicious activity, which is materialized as a set of events
that match, possibly partially, an attack signature. Then, if the
local observations are not sufficient, additional evidences are
gathered from other nodes. Rather than sniffing or inspecting
the incoming or outcoming traffic, as it is the case with any
of the detection systems that have been proposed in order to
operate in ad hoc networks, we take advantage of the audit logs
that are generated by the routing protocol. While not requiring
changes in the implementation of the routing protocol, this
approach permits to take advantage and leverage the work
that is already achieved by the routing protocol. Logs are
parsed so that patterns of events that characterize intrusion
attempts are identified. In order to minimize the number of
investigations, events are categorized, and depending on their
level of criticality, distributed and cooperative investigation
is whether conducted to glean additional observations (and
possibly attack evidences). The main challenge stems from
the difficulty involved in stating the occurrence of an attack
based on second-hand evidences that may come from colluding
attacker(s). To tackle this issue, we introduce an entropy-based
trust system that evaluates the trustworthiness of the nodes
that provide the evidences. As a result, the robustness of the
detection is increased. In addition, we introduce the notion of
confidence interval, which is intended to measure the amount
of confidence in a detection-related decision given an uncertain
environment. Whereas the evaluation of the intrusion system
is found in [6], preliminary evaluations of the trust system are
herein provided.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. We first
survey attacks on ad hoc routing protocols (§II). Grounded
upon the defined intrusion signatures, we present our intrusion
detection system (§III). Then, we illustrate the trust system
(§IV) and evaluate its performance (§V). Finally, we conclude
with a summary of our results along with directions for future
works (§VII).
II. VULNERABILITIES
In ad hoc networks, many attacks threaten the routing
functionality. This comes from the fact that (i) no security
countermeasure has been decided as part of the RFCs that
specify the behavior of routing protocols, (ii) the absence
of a centralized infrastructure complicates the deployment of
preventive measures e.g., firewalls, and (iii) devices operate
as routers, which facilitates the manipulation of messages and
more generally the compromising of the routing. Thus, routing
protocols constitute a key target for the intruders. In order
to illustrate our presentation, let us exemplify attacks on a
specific protocol: the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR)
[5].
A. Background on OLSR
OLSR aims at maintaining a constantly updated view of
the network topology on each device. One fundamental is
the notion of multipoint relay (MPR): each device selects a
subset of 1-hop neighbors, the MPRs, that are responsible
for forwarding the control traffic. The idea is to select the
minimum number1 of MPRs that cover 2-hops neighbors so
as to reduce the number of nodes retransmitting messages and
hence keep to a minimum the bandwidth overload. In practice,
a node N selects MPRs among the 1-hop neighbors that
are announced in periodic heartbeat messages, termed hello
messages. Then, a Topology Control (TC) message intended
to be diffused in the entire network, is created by the selected
MPR(s). In this message, a MPR declares the nodes (including
N ) that selected itself to act as a MPR. Then, any device can
compute the shortest path, represented as a sequence of MPRs,
to any destination. In addition, last versions of the specification
support a node holding several network interfaces which are
declared (if many) in a so-called MID (Multiple Interface
Declaration) message. This message is broadcasted regularly
by MPRs so that one another maps multiple interfaces with
a main address, hence permitting a unique identification.
Additional extensions have been devised in compliance with
the above-summarized core functions. Examples include (i)
dealing with the nodes that commit (or not) to carry the traffic
for others, and (ii) supporting interconnection of an OLSR
MANET with another routing domain. Overall, these core and
auxiliary functionalities are together subject to various attacks.
B. Attacks Targeting OLSR
OLSR is vulnerable to several attacks, which are hereafter
classified [7] according to the action which is undertaken on
the routing:
• Drop attacks consist in dropping routing message(s)
rather than relaying it.
• Active forge attacks generate novel and deceptive routing
message(s).
• Modify and forward attacks modify a received routing
message(s) before forwarding it.
Drop attack is characterized by a node I , potentially an
attacker or a selfish node, which drops a message instead of
relaying it (i.e., I does not forward it within the maximum
allowed period). Threatened messages are restricted to the
messages that are created and relayed by MPR(s); an attempt to
drop all these packets is termed black hole whereas selective
dropping is named gray hole. Rather than dropping traffic,
an opposite behavior consists in introducing (falsified) routing
information.
Active forge comes from a node that injects novel and
deceptive routing messages. Among others, the (broadcast)
storm aims at exhausting resources (e.g., energy). For this
1Redundant MPRs may be selected to increase the availability.
purpose, an intruder I forges a large number of control
messages CM within a short period of time. This attack
may be conducted in a distributed manner with several nodes
colluding so as to emit (a large number of) messages. Such
an attack is characterized by a high visibility and is hence
typically coupled with a masquerade: I spoofs2 the identity of
another node. Identity spoofing is not limited to masquerading:
it may be intended to create conflicting route(s) and loop(s).
In addition, it may be coupled with a modification of the
willingness field so as to impact the selection of MPR. Recall
that MPRs are selected among the nodes with the highest
willingness and in case of multiple choices, the node providing
a reachability to the maximum number of 2-hops nodes is
primarily selected, then an intruder setting the willingness
attribute to will never (resp. will always), ensures that the
target is never (resp. always) selected as MPR.
In addition, active forges cover the introduction of tampered
messages. This tampering typically keeps the message syntac-
tically correct and focuses on the routing information that are
central to the establishment of the shortest paths, i.e., the link
state information included in the Hello message, the topology
declaration provided in the TC message, the external route(s)
in the HNA message and the multiple network interface(s)
declared in the MID message. For instance, the neighboring
adjacency may be perverted by a node I , which advertises
falsified neighboring adjacency in the hello message so as
to impact the selection of MPR(s). Upon the reception of a
falsified message, local routing tables are corrupted and may
contaminate the network itself as well as any interconnected
routing domain if a gateway exports those OLSR routes. Note
that the gateway may also forge itself wrong routes. Generally
speaking, similar tampering may be performed by a MPR
relaying control messages (and is henceforth omitted hereafter
due to the lack of space).
Modify and forward attacks are characterized by an in-
termediate that captures the control message and replays
or/and modifies this message before forwarding it. Replaying a
message includes delaying (i.e., forwarding latter potentially in
another area) and repeating this message. As a result, routing
tables are updated with obsolete information. Both attacks can
be performed in a distributed manner with two intruders: one
recording the message from one region so as to replay it in
another region (i.e., the one of the colluding intruder); this
leads to the creation of a wormhole. In order to stay invisible,
both intruders may keep the identification field unchanged:
the source is still S. Note that sequence numbers constitute
a standard mechanism that provides protection against replay
attacks. Based on those numbers, a node identifies freshest
information, prevents duplicates and replaying while indicating
insertion/deletion. In counterpart, there usage may be hijacked.
For instance, an intruder I may forward the message including
an increased sequence number. Thus, the source assumes that
I provides the freshest route.
2This case should be distinguished from a node that holds several interfaces
(and hence several identities) and advertises these latter in the dedicated MID
message.
III. INTRUSION DETECTION
We propose a distributed, log- and signature-based intrusion
detection system that periodically analyses the OLSR logs.
These logs characterize the activities of OLSR (e.g., packet re-
ception, MPR selection). From a practical perspective, the ad-
vantage of a log-based detection is threefold. First, additional
logs, e.g., system-, security-related logs, could be integrated
and correlated. Second, no change in the implementation of
the OLSR protocol is required. Third, no in-depth analysis
of the packet that are changed is required. Once parsed, a
log is used so as to detect a sign of suspicious activity. This
consists in matching the log against predefined signatures; a
signature is thought as a partially ordered sequence of events
that characterizes a misbehaving activity. Let first exemplify
the establishment of a signature based on the link spoofing
attack, which constitutes an active forge attack, we purposely
developed.
A. Signature of a Link Spoofing Attack
This attack attempts to compromise the routing protocol
and in particular the neighboring topology (i.e., adjacent links)
that is perceived by nodes. It corresponds to a spoofing attack
wherein messages are tampered with incorrect information
relating to adjacent links. Generally speaking, this attacks
constitutes an illustration of a spoofing attack and shows many
similarities with the spoofing attacks wherein topology infor-
mation (TC messages), network interfaces (MID) or routes
(HNA messages) are tempered. It follows that the related attack
signature and detection strategy are quite share identical.
More particularly, in order to perform a link spoofing attack,
an intruder I forges at t′ a hello message, which declares 1-
hop and symmetric neighbors NS′I differing from the real
ones NSI : S
hello(NS′I)t′←−−−−−−−− I,NS′I 6= NSI ⇒ I ∈ I. When
forging NS′I , the attacker holds 3 options:
• declaring a non-existing node as a symmetric neighbor,
implies that I (or another misbehaving node) is further
selected as a MPR (Expression 1): if I advertises a
non-existing node N (N /∈ N with N defining the
set of nodes composing the OLSR network), I ensures
that no other (well-behaving) MPR claims being a 1-
hop symmetric neighbor of N . Recall that MPRs are
selected so that all the 2-hops and symmetric neighbors
are covered, I is selected as a MPR.
hello(NSS)t←−−−−−−−− S, S hello(NS
′
I)t′←−−−−−−−− I, |t′ − t| < 4t,
∃N ∈ NS′I 3: N /∈ N ∩NSI
⇓
I ∈ I,∃I ′ ∈ I ∩NSS 3: I ′ ∈MPRS ,
Card(NS′I\NS′I ∩N ) > 0.
(1)
This is verified as long as no other misbehaving neighbor
of S claims the same. Overall, inserting at least one non-
existing neighbor (∃N ∈ NS′I 3: N /∈ N ∩NSI ) guar-
anties that a misbehaving node I ′ (with I ′ ∈ I) is selected
to act as a MPR of S (∃I ′ ∈ I ∩NSS 3: I ′ ∈MPRS).
In addition to the above, the connectivity of I increases.
• declaring that an existing node is a symmetric 1-hop
neighbor whereas it is not the case (∃X ∈ NS′I ∩ N 3:
X /∈ NSI ). This claiming increases artificially the con-
nectivity of I , i.e., Card((NS′I\[NS′I∩NSI ])∩N ) > 0.
If no (well-behaving) MPR covers S (@M ∈ N\I 3:
M ∈ NSS ∧X ∈ NSM ), then at least one misbehaving
node is selected as a MPR of S (∃I ′ ∈ I 3: I ′ ∈
MPRS). This typically characterizes an attempt to create
a blackhole: I introduces a novel path that provisions the
blackhole.
hello(NSS)t←−−−−−−−− S, S hello(NS
′
I)t′←−−−−−−−− I, |t′ − t| < 4t,
∃X ∈ NS′I ∩N 3: X /∈ NSI
⇓
I ∈ I,
Card((NS′I\[NS′I ∩NSI ]) ∩N ) > 0,
@M ∈ N\I 3: M ∈ NS ∧X ∈ NM
⇓
∃I ′ ∈ I 3: I ′ ∈MPRS .
(2)
• omitting an existing 1-hop symmetric neighbor P (∃P ∈
NSI 3: P /∈ NS′I ), decreases artificially the connectivity
of both P and I (NSI * NS′I ):
hello(NSS)t←−−−−−−−− S, S hello(NS
′
I)t′←−−−−−−−− I,
|t′ − t| < 4t, ∃P ∈ NSI 3: P /∈ NS′I
⇓
I ∈ I,∃I ′ ∈ I ∩NSS , NSI * NS′I .
(3)
Overall, such a falsification of the neighboring adjacency
perverts the topology seen by S and may impact the selection
of MPR(s) of S.
B. Link Spoofing Detection
Obtaining a complete, accurate and timeliness detection of
a link spoofing attack is especially memory and bandwidth-
consuming: it involves the examination of local logs, the
requesting of others so as to collect/correlate additional in-
trusion evidences, and the matching of the agreed evidences
against an intrusion signature. Indeed, in the worst case, a
node S should continuously exchanges information about the
link states between any 1-hop neighbors and their respective
adjacent neighbors. Rather than launching a cooperative in-
vestigation upon any changes, we minimize the number of
investigations by initiating it only when the event that occurs
is relevant to a link spoofing attack. Changes in the 1-hop
neighborhoods (e.g., node apparition) are observed by the node
itself. In practice, those changes are obtained by analyzing
the local logs and they do not require the requesting of other
nodes to be established. In addition, changes in the 2-hops
neighborhood are restricted to the following:
• A MPR is replaced (Evidence 1, E1 for short), which
means that a change in the covering of 1-hop neigh-
bors leads to this replacement. This comes from 1-
hop neighbor(s), possibly the replacing MPR, that in-
crease(s)/decreases it/their coverage(s) to the detriment
of the replaced MPR.
• No MPR replacement takes place but a previously-
selected MPR is detected as misbehaving. For instance,
messages are dropped, forged or misrelayed by that
MPR (E2). Overall, a spoofing link also covers the case
wherein an intruder continues to advertise identical 1-
hops neighbors despite recent changes.
• a MPR is the only one that provides the connectivity to
node(s) (E3).
• a MPR does not cover its adjacent neighbor(s) (E4).
• a MPR provides connectivity to a non-neighbor (E5).
(E1 ∨ E2) , optional(E3)
⇓ ⇓
E4 ∨ E5 (!E4∧!E5)
⇓ ⇓
The suspicious MPR The suspicious MPR
is an intruder. is well-behaving.
(4)
Note that contrary to case E1, others cases are not neces-
sarily event-driven and may be handled by launching period-
ical/random checks. The occurrence of (E1) or (E2) is the
starting point for further investigation. Note that a MPR that
is the only one that provides the connectivity to node(s) (E3)
is suspicious but this condition is not sufficient to launch an
investigation: (i) this situation is typical in a sparse network
and (ii) 2 nodes within communication range often fail in
communicating due to the unpredictable nature of wireless
transmission resulting from, e.g., obstacles, noises. Thus, diag-
nosing E3 is especially difficult under no specific assumption.
Overall, the occurrence of either E1 or E2 and optionally E3
leads to an in-depth investigation. In practice, the investigator
interrogates the 1-hops neighbor(s) of the suspicious MPR so
as to discover whether the suspicious MPR does not cover its
neighbors (E4) or advertises a distant node (E5). If all the
requested nodes confirm (resp. infirm) E4 or E5 , then the
MPR is suspected (resp. well-behaving). Note that, if part of
those requested nodes express a different opinion, the number
of these nodes and their reputations is taken into account (as
established in §IV).
C. Cooperative Investigation
The cooperative investigation is intended to gather intrusion
evidences that are matched against an intrusion signature. This
investigation (Algorithm 1) is conducted as follows. First, the
2-hops neighbours that have shown their MPR(s) changed, are
established. For this purpose, replacing MPR(s) and replaced
MPR(s) are computed (lines 2, 3); the 2-hop neighbors that
are covered by both are established (line 4). In practice, this
interrogation of a 2-hops neighbor Si consists in sending a
request to Si so that this latter provides in return its local
Algorithm 1 : Advanced Investigation
1: SuspiciousMPRs = new (MPR)
2: OldMPRs = getReplaced-MPR();
3: for (suspiciousMPR ∈ SuspiciousMPRs) do
4: Common2HopsNeighbors = getCom-
mon2HopsNeighors(suspiciousMPR, OldMPRs)
5: for (2HopsNeighbor ∈ Common2hopsNeighbors) do
6: if (verifyLink(2HopsNeighbor, suspiciousMPR)== false) then
7: Desagreeing2HopsNeighbor (suspiciousMPR) +=
suspiciousMPR;
8: else
9: Agreeing2HopsNeighbor(suspiciousMPR) += suspiciousMPR;
10: end if
11: end for
12: SuspiciousMPRs = SuspiciousMPRs - suspiciousMPR;
13: end for
topology (including the status of the link between I and Si).
The request and the related answer together should not go
through both the suspicious MPR I or a colliding intruder I ′j .
This avoidance is required to prevent I and I ′j from dropping
the request and/or simply forging a defective answer. But, this
cannot be guaranteed: it depends on the network topology.
Note that if no alternative path is available, then one fall into
case E3. In order to avoid I and I ′j , another MPR that also
covers the requested 2-hops neighbors is provided the request.
If no answer is obtained (i.e., when the related time-out
elapses), then the demand is sequentially transferred through
the rest of the covering MPR, and if no MPR is left, then a
(multi-hops) alternative path is researched in the routing table
to reach Si. Note that this interrogation is performed within
a thread so that the investigation of one node (and the result
waiting) is not blocking for others. If no answer is provided
at all about the suspicious MPR, then the suspicious MPR is
tagged as not verified. If no deny is provided, the suspicious
MPR I is defined as well behaving. Otherwise, if Si denies the
fact that the suspicious MPR I is a 1-hop symmetric neighbor
then that link between Si and I is controversial (Si may have
returned an incorrect answer and/or I initiated a link spoofing).
To takle the issue of distinguishing, we propose a trust system.
IV. TRUST SYSTEM
A trust system is useful when there exists an uncertainty
which prevents from accurately establishing a judgment. A
trust system entails two main activities: the establishment of
a trust relationship (§IV-A) and the dynamic update of this
existing relationship. For this purpose, the system makes use
of the observations provided during the investigation.
A. Trust Establishment
A trust relation TA,I established between two nodes A and
I represents how much A beliefs that I acts as expected. This
belief is built according to I ’s previous activities [8]. Indeed,
based on the evidences that are collected, the system evaluates
the trustworthiness. Generally speaking, several properties
should be taken into account during the establishment of the
trustworthiness:
• Properties 1: the beneficial activity that is performed by
a node increases the trustworthiness of that node, whereas
a harmful activity decreases the trustworthiness. Exam-
ples of beneficial activity includes the normal relaying
of the traffic. In contrast, an harmful activity related
to e.g., an intrusion or the supplying of an incorrect
answer/feedback to an investigation request.
• Properties 2: the degree of gravity (versus reputability)
of a harmful (versus beneficial) activity influences the
risk for other nodes and hence should be reflected in the
establishment of the trust value.
• Properties 3: the risk characterized by the imminence
of the intrusion decreases drastically the trustworthiness.
This risk is established based on the sequence of evi-
dences characterizing the evolving of the attack
• Properties 4: fresh activities should be privileged in
opposition to stale activities.
• Properties 5: first hand evidences (i.e., evidences that
are gleaned by the node itself) are privileged comparing
to the second hand information which are subject to
controversial.
The above properties are enforced as follows. A node A
calculates the trust T∆t(A, I) of a node I based on the n
evidences eA,I1 , ..., e
A,I
i , ..., e
A,I
n about I that are collected by
A during a time slot ∆t:
TA,I∆t =
n∑
j=0
αje
A,I
j + βT
A,I
∆(t−1) (5)
Beneficial and harmful evidences eA,Ij take respectively pos-
itive and negative values (property 1). A weighting factor αj
pondered eA,Ij so as to reflect the degree of gravity/reputability
of this evidence (property 2) as well as the risk (property 3).
Meanwhile, a forgetting factor β permits to privilege fresh
evidences rather than the stale evidences that were computed
at the previous time slot ∆(t− 1) (property 5) .
When the observations of A are not sufficient, additional
evidences provided by other nodes are gleaned. These ev-
idences are less reliable than the local observations. Thus,
an uncertainty is involved. To compute such an uncertainty,
we rely on the entropy, a measure of uncertainty stated in
information theory [9]. As in [10], [11], we establish trust
through a third party (termed concatenated propagation) and
through recommendations provided by multiple sources (called
multipath propagation). Let a recommendation RA,S represent
how much A trusts the recommendations generated by S.
A builds its belief about I according to a third party S’s
recommendation as follows:
TcA,I∆t = R
A,S
∆t T
S,I
∆t (6)
When multiple nodes S1, S2, ..., Sm generate a recommen-
dation, A builds its belief about I as follows:
TmA,I∆t =
m∑
i=1
wi.R
A,Si
∆t .T
Si,I
∆t (7)
where wi = 1m∑
j=0
R∆tA,Sj
Overall, the trust relationship is used to secure the intrusion
detection and guide the decision making.
B. Trusted Intrusion Detection
The trustworthiness of the node(s) that provide second-
hand observations is taken into account so as to prevent
as much as possible misbehaving nodes from foiling the
detection. The objective is to favor the observation provided
by trustworthy nodes while being detrimental to misbehaving
nodes. A misbehaving node is disserviced unless this latter
ameliorates its trustworthiness.
In practice, let consider an adjacent link that is established
between a suspicious node I and its neighbor Si and that is
potentially subject to a link spoofing attack. The investigation
results in a contestation between I and Si about this link.
In order to establish whether I is launching a link spoofing,
the second-hand evidences eS1,I , ..., eSi,I , ..., eSm,I that are
provided by the m 1-hops neighbors of I (S1, ..., Sm) are
aggregated (Formula 8): each evidence eSi,Ii is pondered with a
weighting factor along with the trust TA,Si that the investigator
A shares with the requested Si.
DetectA,I∆t =
m∑
i=1
wiTA,Sie
Si,I
i (8)
with wi = 1m∑
j=0
TA,Sj
.
An evidence eSi,Ii is either equal to 1 (meaning that link that
is advertised by I is correct and there is no spoofing attack
lead by I) or in the contrary −1 (meaning that the advertised
link is wrong). Note that if a requested node Si does not return
an answer (before the waiting time expires) then eSi = 0. As
a result, an attack that is carried by I by falsifying a specific
link I−Si if DetectA,I∆t is nearly equal to -1. Once stated, this
result is used to update the trust related to I and S1, ..., Sm.
C. Level of Confidence
One difficulty comes from the fact that the environment is
composed of both well-behaving and misbehaving nodes, and
is typified by its unreliable nature coming from e.g., the high
level of collisions. Thus, confirming or refuting the occurrence
of an intrusion relying on second-hand and possibly partial
evidences is error prone. It is hence critical to measure the
level of confidence on the detection in such an uncertain
environment. For this purpose, we use the confidence interval
[12] that corresponds to an estimated range which is likely to
include an unknown population parameter, the estimated range
being calculated from a given set of sample data. Herein, based
on a partial set of evidences e1, ..., en (namely the sample),
our objective lies in estimating a range wherein the overall
population of evidences is likely to fall. This range; called the
confidence interval, is given by [ ¯DetectA,I∆t −ε, ¯DetectA,I∆t +ε]
with ε defining the allowed margin of error. The likelihood
that the overall population falls into the confidence interval
corresponds to a probability, e.g., 95%, named confidence
level (cl for short). This confidence level is a configuration
parameter of the trust system. Given a standard deviation σ
and the standard density z of a normal law, the margin of error
ε is calculated as follows:
ε = z
σ√
n
(9)
With a σ =
√
n∑
i=0
(m¯−eA,Sii )
2
n−1 and m¯ corresponding to the
mean. It follows that the higher is the confidence level, the
wider gets the confidence interval. Overall, the confidence
interval depends of three factors: the required confidence
level that is parameterized, the number of observations that
is provided, the spread of the observations. As such it permits
to guide the decision of establishing if an attack takes place
whereas a limited number of recommendations is provided
by potentially well-behaving and misbehaving nodes. If the
confidence interval is too wide then more evidences should be
provided to estimate the trustworthiness in routing (or other
operation) decisions. For this purpose, we apply the following
rule: I is well-behaving if γ ≤ DetectA,I − Ci ≤ 1I is intruder if − 1 ≤ DetectA,I + Ci ≤ −γ
I is unrecognized if other
(10)
When the investigation falls into the unrecognized range
then more evidences should be collected in order to confirm/
refuting the existence of the intrusion. However, linking the
investigation to the trustworthiness of the nodes increases the
accuracy of detection as it will be shown in the next section.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performances of our trust system are evaluated with
regard to the percentage of attackers and liars, and the required
time (expressed as a number of investigation rounds) that is
necessary to detect the intrusion and establish the trustwor-
thiness. Experiments are performed as follows. We consider
16 nodes including 1 attacker which performs a link spoofing
attack and 4 (i.e., 26.3%) colluding misbehaving nodes (liars)
that do not perform link spoofing but that foil the detection
by providing incorrect answers. Initially, we randomly set the
trust that is assigned to each node. The intruder launches a link
spoofing attack that, unless specified, takes place during the
overall experiment. Similarly, misbehaving nodes lie during
the overall experiments. Figure 1 provides the trust values as
seen by the node that is attacked. The constant maintaining of
the well-behaving and misbehaving explains the (monotonous)
ascending versus descending rate of the trust assigned to
those nodes. One may note the defensive nature of our trust
system which is characterised by the fact that the trust value
assigned to a liar decreases largely regardless of its initial
trust value. While the well-behaving nodes which have low
initial trust values gain a little of trustworthiness during the
25 rounds. Then, if the attack ceases (Figure 2), the impact of
the forgetting factor on both the liars and the well-behaving
nodes is provided. One may note that the nodes with high
or medium initial trust values reach the default (initial) trust
Fig. 1. Trustworthiness.
value (herein 0.4) in the last rounds. While the nodes that
have initially a low initial trust value are recovered slowly
and consequently may not reach this value. This represents
again the defensive nature of our trust system which demands
a long misconduct-less duration before trusting a former liar.
Fig. 2. Impact of the Forgetting Factor on the Trustworthiness.
The impact of liars on the investigation is shown in Figure 3.
As expected, the greatest is the number of liars the slowest gets
the detection. However, after 10 rounds, the result of the inves-
Fig. 3. Impact of liars on the detection.
tigation falls down to −0.4 even when liars represent 43.2%
of the nodes. Furthermore, in the last rounds, the investigation
converges and reaches −0.8 regardless of the percentage of
liars. This comes from the fact that the trust provided to liars
diminishes along the investigation and consequently, liars have
almost no influence on the investigation in the last rounds.
Overall, node cannot misbehave and keep its trustworthiness
at a high level. Hence, the impact of liars on the investigation
shrinks along the time. It is worth to be mentioned that an
investigation does not necessary last until that all liars are
assigned with a low trust value. It is rather terminated at any
round by confirming (resp. denying) the existence of a link
spoofing when the investigation result exceeds for instance
−0.6 (resp. 0.6).
VI. RELATED WORK
Securing ad hoc routing protocols by relying on a trust
system constitutes a popular approach. In [13], [14], the DSR
protocol [15] is protected against blackhole. Each node over-
hears the communication of its neighbors in order to monitor
the number of dropped packets. If that number exceeds a
given threshold, the dropper is identified as distrustful and
the routes going through that dropper is either negatively
rated [14] or eliminated [13]. More sophisticated trust model
based on a modified Bayesian distribution is applied in [16]
to protect DSR against dropping. For this purpose, nodes are
organized in clusters, each governed by a cluster-head that is
responsible for giving a trust certificate to a node according
to the recommendations provided by its cluster’s members. A
subjective logic-based trust system is further used to secure the
AODV protocol [17]. When a node receives a message that has
gone through an untrusted node, it demands a digital signature
to the source of this message. If not provided, the node
ignores this message. CAP-OLSR [10] relies on an information
theoretic trust system to prevent the OLSR protocol from
collusion attack. A node A, which holds I as a MPR asks its 1-
, 2-hops neighbor(s) whether I relays its TC messages. Based
on the returned observations, A calculates the entropy-based
trust of I . If the resulting trust is lower than a given threshold,
then I is excluded from MPRs. In order to deal with false
recommendations/accusations, only first-hand information (as
it is the most trustful) are used in [14]. As a result, the system
is incapable of calculating the trust for the nodes with no
previous interactions whereas building the trust relationship is
time-consuming. To tackle this issue, in [18], less weight is
assigned to the second-hand recommendations in a Bayesian-
based trust system wherein the prior distribution is a Beta
function. These second-hand recommendations results from
exchanging periodically self-observations between neighbors.
Herein, recommendations that are not close to the actual
trust value are rejected; the threshold is set using ordinary
differential equation [19]. The previous system is enhanced
in [20] by i) giving less weight to the old evidences to
allow reputation fading and ii) maintaining for each node two
indicators, its reputation (i.e., node trustworthiness) as well as
recommendation trustfulness. Only trustful recommendations
are considered. In [21], authors rely on an objective-based trust
system to resist against attacks that aim to isolate a node. They
used a modified Bayesian approach wherein a recommendation
is weighted according to the trust value of its source and
expires in an exponential manner.
Other works aim to restrict packets relaying within the trustful
nodes [11], [22], [23], [24]. In [11], an entropy-based and
probability-based models are used to merge the recommen-
dations about a target node. While in [22] trust relationships
between the nodes are modeled by a weighted direct graph
wherein the vertices represent the nodes and the weighted
edge represents the trust values assigned to these nodes. Node-
based Trust Management (NAT) [24] aims to choose the most
trustful routes in a cluster-based MANT wherein a trusted
authority generates symmetric keys. These keys are supplied
to the nodes in order to encrypt/decrypt the recommendations
that are exchanging in the network. [23] distinguishes itself by
using the threat information that are generated by local IDSs as
evidences of trust. These evidences are exchanged periodically
in form of reports between the nodes. The trust value assigned
to a target node is calculated as the average of the reported
trust values. Herein, a report is pondered according to the trust
value of its source, the distance in hops toward its source and
the freshness of the report.
Synthesis and Discussion:
Trust systems depend on self-observations and/or recommen-
dations so as to build trustworthiness between the nodes,
henceforth misbehaving nodes are avoided. Part of these sys-
tems ensures the robustness against falsified recommendations,
which may foil trustworthiness evaluation, by giving low
weight for both second-hand and past observations. Over-
come, they do not take into account the case when some
recommendations are missed given an uncertain environment,
hence the trustworthiness evaluation is based on a limited
number of recommendations. Our trust system, which aims
to secure intrusion detection-related operations, tackles this
issue by proposing the concept of confidence interval. This
concept permits to measure the level of confidence on the
trustworthiness evaluation according to the number and the
coherence of the available evidences/recommendations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Signature- and specification-based detection are unpopular
comparing to anomaly detection. This calls for consolidating
efforts on signature- and specification-based detection while
following the habitus that lies in coupling detection systems
together. To meet this requirement, we define the signatures
of the attacks targeting OLSR. These signatures are utilized
by a log-based, distributed intrusion detection system. This
system distinguishes itself by analyzing the logs generated by
a routing protocol so as to extract intrusion evidences. These
latter are compared against predefined intrusion signatures and
may activate the investigation according to their degree of
suspicion/gravity. In order to exemplify our system, we have
developed a link spoofing attack, build the related detection
rules, and evaluate the performance of the proposed system.
To prevent misbehaving nodes from providing falsified evi-
dences/answers during the investigation, an entropy-based trust
system is utilized. This trust system evaluates periodically
the trustworthiness of each node according to its behavior.
Then, this trustworthiness is taken into account so as to
prevent as much as possible misbehaving nodes from foil-
ing the detection. The objective is to favor the observation
provided by trustworthy nodes while being detrimental to
misbehaving nodes. On difficulty is that this environment is
not only composed of misbehaving nodes but is also typified
by its unreliable nature coming from to e.g., the high level
of collisions. Thus, confirming or refuting the occurrence
of an intrusion relying on second-hand and possibly partial
evidences is error prone. It is hence critical to measure the
level of confidence that is put in the detection in such an
uncertain environment. For this purpose, we proposed to rely
on the confidence interval. According to this indicator, the
robustness of the detection-related decisions is increased.
Overall, experiments show that the trust system efficiently
distinguishes between misbehaving and well-behaving nodes
during the investigation. The impact of misbehaving node
is further fading along the time because its trustworthiness
decreases continuously. This leads to enhance gradually the
accuracy of detection. Furthermore, recovering from a negative
trustworthiness requires that the node well-behave for long
time.
In the near future, we envisage to use different weighting of the
evidences according to their gravity/reputability. In addition,
more experiences are planned in order to evaluate the impact
of mobility on trustworthiness evaluation, and the resource
consumption that is related to the trust system.
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